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STUDENT NOTES
A]~nNwTmmr-n= LAw-EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REv -v-RuINTGs OF
THE FEDERAL COMMEUNICATIONS COMMisSION.-A number of rules
governing the extent of judicial review of findings of fact made
by federal administrative tribunals have been formulated by various
statutes and decisions. From the many cases arising as a result
of the ever increasing expansion of the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies and the activities regulated by such agencies there has
developed one general proposition. The rule that has generally
come to be determinative of the question of the scope of judicial
review of findings of fact in cases before federal administrative
agencies may be stated thus: the findings of fact are reviewable to
the extent that the reviewing court is allowed to determine whether
or not the findings are supported by substantial evidence.1 For
example, in one case involving an order of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission the United States Supreme Court said, "Our
duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission
was based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made
pursuant to authority granted by Congress."
2
1 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 805 U.S. 197 (1936). This is the
rule applicable to most but not all of the federal administrative tribunals.
2 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224 (1942).
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